





Though the social world is real and objective, the way that social facts arise out of other
facts is in an important way shaped by human thought, talk and behaviour. Building on
recent  work  in  social  ontology,  I  describe  a  mechanism  whereby  this  distinctive
malleability of social facts, combined with the possibility of basic human error, makes it
possible  for  a  consistent  physical  reality  to  ground  an  inconsistent  social  reality.  I
explore  various  ways  of  resisting  the  prima  facie  case  for  social  inconsistency.  I
conclude, however, that the prima facie case survives scrutiny, and draw out some of the
ramifications.
Our social arrangements can be suboptimal, and often are. They can be unjust. They can be
inefficient. They can be imperspicuous. They can be unprincipled. In this paper, I discuss
another way in which our social arrangements might be suboptimal: they might give rise
to inconsistency.
The case for  this  is,  in a very small  nutshell,  as  follows.  How people  think,  talk,  and
behave shapes the way that social facts come about. Put more technically, our thought,
talk and behaviour determine the grounding principles by which social facts arise from
other facts about the world. Because we can think, talk and behave in incoherent ways, it
is  possible  for  us  to  arrange  those  grounding  principles  badly,  in  such  a  way that  a
consistent physical world might end up grounding an inconsistent social world. 
In what follows, I will set out that line of reasoning in a lot more detail, and put it under
pressure in a number of ways. This turns out to open up a rich vein of questions about the
metaphysics of the social world. What, exactly, is distinctive about how social facts come
about, and should we be less surprised if such facts turn out to be logically ill-behaved
than if, let’s say, the facts of geology do? What, precisely, is at stake in asking whether
social facts are real? To what extent should our views on what’s possible in social reality
be constrained by our practical and theoretical purposes in dealing with that reality? Some
salient  theoretical  choice-points  are  revealed,  and while  I  will  argue  that  the  case  for
inconsistency survives scrutiny, I will indicate to those committed to consistency where
their best options lie.
1
Beyond its intrinsic interest, the question of social inconsistency has ramifications for other
issues. If the social world is possibly inconsistent, this matters for how we reason about
that world; any logic on which contradictions imply everything (e.g. classical logic) would
be ill-suited to the task. Social inconsistency also matters for normative theory: it is very
common for social facts to have a normative upshot – to give rise to reasons, obligations
and permissions – and it is reasonable to worry that if the social facts are inconsistent,
their  normative  demands  might  sometimes  be  unsatisfiable.  The  possibility  of  social
inconsistency also has methodological consequences: for any phenomenon that is possibly
in whole or part socially constructed, we cannot lay down as a methodological constraint
that our best theory of it will be a consistent one. Since there is much ground to cover in
discussing the question of social consistency itself, my discussion of these ramifications
will be limited, but I will try to indicate what the important questions are and how we can
get started on them.
I proceed as follows. I outline (§1.1)  a certain way of thinking about social facts: a two-
dimensional approach to social ontology. I set out (§1.2) the basic mechanics of one view
in  this  spirit:  Epstein’s  anchoring-grounding  model.  After  some  clarifications  (§2)
concerning  the  notions  of  inconsistency  and  contradiction,  I  articulate  (§3)  how
inconsistency in the social facts might arise. I question (§4) this prima facie case for social
inconsistency  in  a  number  of  ways.  Finally,  I  discuss  (§5,  §6)  some  ramifications  of
accepting it. 
1. The Metaphysics of Social Facts
1.1. The Nature of Social Facts
The social  world  is  made  up of  such  things  as  organisations,  social  groups,  artefacts,
conventions,  practices  and  laws.  It  is  metaphysically  distinctive,  because  its  nature  is
conditioned  by  human  thought,  talk  and  behaviour,  in  particular  thought,  talk  and
behaviour of a collective sort. Whereas the chemical facts, for example, are indifferent to
what we think or expect of them, it seems the social facts wouldn’t be as they are if we
didn’t think about them and react to them as we do. To label this pre-theoretic contrast, we
might say that the social world is humanly malleable in a way that much of the world is
not.
One desideratum for a theory of social reality is that it make sense of this malleability, and
part of that task is to distinguish it from other ways in which we shape the world around
us. We also change the world by building things in it, landscaping it, polluting it, and so
forth.  These  are  profound  ways  in  which  we  can  change  things,  but  they  seem
metaphysically different. These are causal, rather than constitutive ways of determining the
facts.1 While we have causal influence over many parts of reality, it seems distinctive to
1 Discussion of the contrast between causal and constitutive relations in social ontology can be found in
Epstein  (2016a) and  Ásta  (2015),  although  Epstein  calls  what  I  here  call  constitutive  determination
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social reality that we in addition have constitutive influence over it.2 When, for instance, a
state  passes  a  law to  expand the  franchise  to  the  over-15s,  17-year-old  Jane  is  thereby
changed into a voter – there is no causal chain that runs between these facts, just a direct
relation of metaphysical determination. The state could not, however, change the value of
pi to 3 by passing a law to that effect.3
Once we’ve noted this power that we have to constitutively shape the social world, the
challenge is to explain how it works, and to do this in a way that respects its limits. Most
social facts are not subject to arbitrary stipulation, either by individuals or by collectives.
We cannot, for instance, dictate that there is not a recession on; social facts are clearly not
so malleable that they are whatever we want them to be. There is an epistemic dimension
to this too: our relation to the social facts  is  not such that we can know them just  by
inspecting our own attitudes toward them. By and large, we have to  find out  what the
social facts are,  often through pretty onerous research.  One way to put this is  that the
social  facts  seem  to  enjoy  some  form  of  objectivity.4 Making  sense  of  this  objectivity,
whatever precisely it amounts to, is a second desideratum for our theories of social facts,
which has to be squared with the malleability desideratum.
This, it turns out, is somewhat tricky to do. Some theories of social facts, particular earlier
ones, have sought to make sense of the malleability of social facts by characterizing them
as dependent on, or even consisting in, our attitudes.5 Hayek, for instance, writes that “in
the social sciences the things are what people think they are. Money is money, a word is a
word, a cosmetic is a cosmetic, if and because somebody thinks they are.” (Hayek 1943: 3).
This has the virtue of giving us a very concrete proposal for how we constitutively shape
the social facts: for a social fact p, we make it the case that p by believing that p. However,
it seems to put us in a bad position to account for the objectivity of social facts: how would
we not have automatic epistemic access to social facts, if they are as Hayek describes them
here, and how would we not change them by changing our beliefs about them? 
‘ontological’ determination.
2 It may be tempting here to try to contrast the social against the natural, but it may well be that some facts
are both social and natural (Khalidi 2015), so this is not a clean contrast.
3 That this malleability is distinctive of the social should not be taken to mean that it necessarily extends to all
social facts. For some social facts, how they come about might not be up to us at all. Take for instance the fact
that Alice and Bob are jointly attending to a jigsaw puzzle. This seems to be a social fact, but there may not
be anything malleable about what it takes for Alice and Bob to be jointly attending – it could be entirely a
matter of how human beings are wired, as a matter of neuropsychology.
4 Searle (1995) characterizes this as ‘epistemic objectivity’,  to be contrasted with ‘ontological  objectivity’,
which he does not think social facts enjoy; see also Thomasson (2003a). This use of ‘objectivity’ should not be
confused with another sense of the term which may be salient in relation to social facts. Since Weber (1904)
there has been a long-running debate about whether social-scientific enquiry could be objective as opposed
to value-laden (see Reiss and Sprenger (2020) for an overview). That debate is more or less orthogonal to the
issues discussed here.   
5 See  Udehn (2001, chs. 3–4) for an overview and discussion of ‘psychologism’ about social facts in early
social  science.  A  later  approach  with  comparable  metaphysical  implications  would  be  the  global  social
constructivism of Berger and Luckmann (1966).
3
So prima facie, a mind-dependence thesis accounts for the malleability of social facts at the
expense of their objectivity. But there is room to manoeuvre.  Searle (1995), for instance,
manages to strike something of a balance between mind-dependence and objectivity by
making the mind-dependence indirect: the general conditions that have to be met for social
facts to obtain are mind-dependent, but whether things meet those conditions is up to the
world, and not up to us. Thus we may have privileged epistemic access to what it takes for
someone to be a voter, for example, but no privileged epistemic access to whether Jane is a
voter – we’d have to find out Jane’s age first. 
Even  with  such  manoeuvres,  though,  Searle  seems  badly  placed  to  deal  with  certain
features of the social world – for instance, how it can be possible for there to be a recession
on in a society in which no-one has the concept of recession (Thomasson 2003a). For such
and other reasons, various authors (Guala 2014; Epstein 2015; Torregno 2017) have argued
that we should let go of the idea that social facts are mind-dependent. Even without ruling
on that question directly, we can say the following: that it might be best not to tie our
understanding of the malleability of the social world directly to mind-dependence. We
had best start by approaching the combination of our desiderata at a slightly higher level
of  abstraction,  so  that  we  can  decide  at  a  later  point  in  the  story  how  much  mind-
dependence, if any, we should countenance.6
I  am going to suggest  that theories  that do a good job of reconciling malleability  and
objectivity do so by discerning a two-dimensional structure in social reality. Let me explain
what I mean by that.
1.2. Two-dimensionalism about Social Reality
Suppose that Jimmy wants to go on the roller-coaster, but the sign says that one has to be
at least five feet tall to go on. It’s a social fact that Jimmy can’t go on the roller-coaster. If we
want to explain that social fact, the most immediate and natural thing to say is that it is
because Jimmy is only 4’6’’. That is kind of striking: it seems we can account for a social
fact by citing a plain old physical fact. And indeed, relative to that being the rule, Jimmy’s
height is what is salient in explaining why he is roller-coaster-ineligible.
Jimmy may nevertheless demand more explanation. Why can’t he go on, just because he’s
4’6’’? Just telling Jimmy that that’s the rule is unhelpful. The rule could have been different
– the cut-off point could have been 4 foot instead of 5 foot – so we can ask why it is as it is.
The explanation might be, for example, that the person who runs the roller-coaster wrote
‘5 foot’ on the sign, and they have the authority to make the rules. That is a distinct but
complementary explanation of Jimmy’s predicament. It tells us how and why the plain old
physical fact that Jimmy is 4’6’’ has the bearing that it does on the social fact that Jimmy
can’t go on the roller-coaster.
6 A further issue is whether claiming that the social world is mind-dependent would commit us to some
form of anti-realism about social facts. I will postpone discussion of this to section 4.2, where it becomes
dialectically important.
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We can typically distinguish two complementary explanations of this sort with respect to
social facts. One concerns how the world is, and one concerns conditions that we require
of that world. I call this dual explanatory structure a two-dimensional one because it gives
social facts a certain sophisticated modal profile. We can imagine the social world to have
been different in two separate ways. On the one hand, the plain old physical facts that
underpin and determine the social world could have been different. On the other hand,
the conditions  that  we require  those physical  facts  to  fulfil  could have been different.
Jimmy could have gone on the roller-coaster if he’d been taller, and Jimmy could have
gone on the roller-coaster if the rule had been different. 
This  allows  for  two distinct  kinds  of  counterfactual  reasoning about  the  social  world,
which we can usefully think of as involving different modal dimensions. We can hold our
world  fixed  and  consider  what  it  would  be  like  under  the  imposition  of  different
conditions,  or we could hold our conditions fixed and consider  what different  worlds
would be like under the imposition of those conditions. As an analogy, think of the former
as looking at the same planet through a range of different telescopes,  and the latter as
using the same telescope to look at a range of different planets.
This nicely reconciles the desiderata, albeit only at a certain level of abstraction, with many
details left to fill in. One the one hand, this approach does justice to the objectivity of the
social world: social facts are explained and determined by underlying physical facts, and
are just as objective as them, not mere figments of our collective imagination. On the other
hand, it does justice to the malleability of social reality: we human beings – since we’re the
ones who put in place the conditions – are crucially involved in determining how the
social world comes about. 
As it  will turn out, this two-dimensional structure is also what allows us to imagine a
consistent physical world giving rise to an inconsistent social world. To make the case for
that (and, later on, some cases against it) it will help to have somewhat more precise tools
to  work  with  –  for  that  purpose  I  borrow  Brian  Epstein’s  (2015; 2016a) anchoring-
grounding model.
1.3. The Anchoring-Grounding Model
Two-dimensional models of social facts have been around for a while, if not always under
that description. Searle’s (1995; 2010) theory of institutional facts arguably has this sort of
structure, or an approximation of it, under its hood, though Searle himself did not draw
out this aspect and sometimes glosses his theory in ways that go against it. The same goes
for theories that either build upon or resemble Searle’s theory, such as  Hindriks (2009),
Thomasson (2003b) or Tuomela (2013). A more explicitly two-dimensional approach was
proposed by  Einheuser (2003; 2006) – she adapts a Kaplan-style semantics for context-
sensitive terms to give a metaphysics of convention-dependent facts, with special attention
given to modelling counterfactual  reasoning about such facts.  But the most developed
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two-dimensional  theory is  arguably  Brian Epstein’s  (2015;  2016a) anchoring-grounding
model.7
On Epstein’s theory social facts are first of all associated with  grounds,  in the standard
metaphysical sense: facts that underlie and metaphysically determine them.8 The grounds
associated with a given social fact may themselves be social facts, but by looking at the
grounds of those facts and so on and so forth, we eventually get to some non-social facts,
because the social world is not metaphysically basic. The facts that can play the grounding
role with respect to social facts are not of any specific type: what they look like depends on
the kind of fact that’s being grounded. That something is a dollar bill is grounded in how
and where  it  was  manufactured  (a  fact  about  its  history);  that  someone is  popular  is
grounded in how other people regard them (a fact about attitudes) that Jimmy can’t go on
the roller-coaster is grounded in his height (a fact about physical properties).
When we ask why some social facts are as they are, we are typically asking about their
grounds,  in  the  first  instance.  If  it’s  a  fact  that  Fred  is  guilty  of  bicycle  theft,  that’s
explained by his taking a bicycle that wasn’t his. The latter fact grounds the former. But as
in Jimmy’s case, there are further questions to be asked. Why is  that what it takes to be
guilty of bicycle theft? Now we’re asking why the grounding relations run as they do. In
Epstein’s  theory the  grounding principles  that  govern a  given case are  explained and
determined by different facts which he calls anchors. In this particular case, the anchoring
facts  will  be facts  about the legislative process which led to some law governing theft
being  adopted.  Anchors  are  often  social  facts  themselves,  and  what  they  anchor  are
grounding principles of the general form ‘if A, then A grounds B’ (where B is some social
fact). The facts that show up among the grounds and the anchors are not metaphysically
7 See Kocurek, Jerzak, and Rudolph (2020) for a recent elaboration and application of Einheuser’s approach.
8 In brief: grounding is a cross-level relation between facts that underpins a distinctive kind of metaphysical
explanation, one that is constitutive rather than causal. As a matter of definition, when some fact A grounds
some fact  B, A is  more fundamental  than B.  Formally the grounding relation is  typically thought to be
asymmetric,  irreflexive and transitive,  though there is debate  on this (cf.  Rodriguez-Pereyra 2015).  Some
regard the  grounding relation as  an  independent  theoretical  posit,  while  others  take  grounding talk  to
indifferently  refer  to  various  cross-level  metaphysical  relations  such  as  composition,  constitution  and
realisation (cf.  Wilson 2014).  These debates won’t bear on the argument here.  Griffith (2017) specifically
discusses the application of grounding theory in social ontology.
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different kinds of facts, and one and the same fact could feature in either role on occasion.
But the explanatory roles are different.9 10
The grounding principles together compose what Epstein calls the  frame (hence he also
calls  them ‘frame  principles’).  One  could  think  of  a  frame simply  as  a  set  of  all  the
grounding principles that are in force. Another, more model-theoretic and coarse-grained
way of thinking of it is as a function from worlds (without social facts) to worlds (with
social  facts).  The  space  of  possible  frames  and  the  space  of  possible  worlds-not-yet-
endowed-with-social-facts (‘pre-social worlds’, for short) constitute the two dimensions of
a two-dimensional model;  we can think counterfactually about the social world in one
way by holding the frame fixed and varying the world, and in another way by holding the
world  fixed  and  varying  the  frame.  We  could  vary  them  in  concert  for  a  ‘diagonal’
counterfactual.11
For our purposes it is worth saying a little more about the kinds of facts that crop up in the
anchoring role. When we have done the work of uncovering the grounding principles that
9 It has been questioned (see Schaffer 2019, and Epstein 2019a in reply) whether anchoring and grounding
are really different relations, and whether the anchors of some social fact are really just more grounds of that
social fact. I do not think this issue affects the argument of this paper. On Schaffer’s view, the facts that put
in place the grounding relations relevant to a social fact become additional grounds of that fact, namely
“rule-setting” grounds – this saves him the need to introduce an additional type of relation. A view like
Schaffer’s can mimic the behaviour of a two-dimensional theory up to a point, by partitioning the grounds of
a given social fact into ‘rule-setting’ and ‘move-making’ grounds and separately consider varying the former
and varying the latter. Epstein (2019a) argues that, among other things, this view cannot adequately model
counterfactual claims about social matters. While the matter is a delicate one, it seems to me that Schaffer’s
approach would struggle particularly with counterfactuals concerning situations in which some facts play
both rule-setting and move-making roles, which would require him to simultaneously vary and hold fixed
the same grounding facts. But the inconsistency-generating scenarios which we will consider here are not
such  situations,  and more  generally  do  not  involve  counterfactuals,  so  there  is  no  obvious  obstacle  to
recasting them in Schaffer’s model.
(It is also worth noting that identifying anchoring as a grounding relation is not ipso facto incompatible with
two-dimensionalism. One could recover two-dimensionality from Schaffer’s view by allowing counterfactual
(im)possibilities  into  the  model  in  which  the grounding principles  are  varied,  but  the  facts  that  would
counterfactually ground those grounding principles  are not accordingly adjusted. I suspect  that Schaffer
would not like that move, but it might be attractive to some.) 
See also Hawley (2019) and Mikkola (2019) for other critical takes on the grounding/anchoring distinction,
and Epstein (2019b) in reply.
10 Epstein’s anchoring-grounding model is iterative: the facts that ground social facts are often themselves
social facts, and thus subject to a similar analysis. The facts that anchor grounding principles are also often
social facts,  so the same applies to them. In addition to this, Epstein thinks that anchoring relations (the
relations  between  anchors  and  the  grounding  principles  they  anchor)  are  contingent  on  the  anchoring
schemata that are in force, which are themselves often contingent upon anchoring facts. So Epstein’s model
can give rise to a complex array of determining relations. But social reality is very complex, so as long as
these relations pull their explanatory weight, this is not something to hold against the model. 
11 There is room to manoeuvre with regard to the underlying model theory. Einheuser (2003; 2006) favours a
theory modelled on Kaplan’s (1989) treatment of indexicals, one which evaluates sentences at a ‘carving’ and
‘substrate’ rather than at a context and world. Epstein (in conversation) favours a multi-frame model which
treats frames as spaces of worlds, and evaluates sentences at a world in a frame. For current purposes the
two approaches are interchangeable.
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govern some aspect of social reality, and we then ask why those grounding principles are
as they are, a variety of facts could come into view.12 
 Facts concerning speech acts or inscriptions. The fact that a crime of robbery needs to
involve a threat of violence is explained (in part) by the fact that a certain form of
words defining the act of robbery appears in the law code. 
 Facts about the functional roles of social kinds or institutions. The fact that waving
your arm can constitute a greeting but thinking happy thoughts cannot is explained (in
part) by the fact that the latter is not outwardly perceptible and hence not apt to play
the role of a greeting.
 Facts about paradigm instances of a social kind. That dancing the Macarena involves
such-and-such moves is explained by the appearance of those very moves in the 1996
music video.
 Stable patterns in behaviour. The fact that deer musk-markings constitute territorial
claims is explained by the fact that deer are stably disposed to react to them in a certain
way.
What this is meant to get across is that a variety of anchoring facts of different kinds can
simultaneously be involved in explaining why the social world works as it does. Unlike
what one might want of, say, an explanation of why the laws of chemistry work as they
do,  it’s  quite  reasonable  to  think  of  social  reality  as  being  ‘cobbled  together’  by  the
distributed  operation  of  many  such  facts.  There  is  not  likely  to  be  a  neat,  unified
explanation on offer of the social world as a whole – rather, there is a patchwork of local
explanations. And harking back to our earlier discussion of mind-dependence, we can see
that  within  Epstein’s  approach,  it  becomes  a  more  local  question  whether  either  the
grounds or the anchors relevant to a given social fact are facts of a mental nature – as
opposed to  Searle  (1995),  mind-dependence is  not an architectural  feature  of  Epstein’s
model.
I will rely on Epstein’s theory to impose some clarity and precision on what follows. But it
will be possible to recapture the gist of what follows in other approaches that admit of
some two-dimensional structure.
2. Inconsistency
Before talking about social inconsistencies specifically, it will also be useful to say a few
things in general about the notions of inconsistency and contradiction.
A contradiction, as it is most typically characterized in logic, is a sentence of the form A &
¬A. Sometimes it is also characterized as a sentence A that is both true and false; these
respectively ‘syntactic’ and ‘semantic’ characterisations are coextensive in many logics, but
I will opt for the former for definiteness. A set of sentences is said to be inconsistent when
12 I’m embroidering on Epstein (2014; 2015; 2016b) here; he is not necessarily committed to countenancing all
these mechanisms.
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a contradiction can be derived from it, and an inconsistency within a set of sentences can
be characterized as a minimal subset of sentences that renders the overall set inconsistent.
In the most basic case, that would be a pair of sentences {’A’, ‘¬A’}, but more than two
sentences may be involved (e.g. {’A  B’, ‘B  C’, ‘C  ¬A’}).→ → → 13
Dialetheism is the position that contradictions are sometimes true: that there are  dialetheias,
truths of the form A & ¬A. The most important motivating cases for dialetheism have been
logical ones, in particular semantic paradoxes like the Liar (“this sentence is false”). Since
satisfactory consistent solutions to semantic paradoxes are hard to achieve, the view that
we cannot solve them and must take their conclusions at face value has gained a foothold
in the philosophy of logic over the last few decades.14 Dialetheism has also sometimes been
defended concerning  other  types  of  cases,  such  as  vagueness  (Hyde 1997) or  physical
change (Priest 1987/2006). There has not, however, been much discussion of dialetheias in
the social world.15
Dialetheism is considered a provocative view, for a few reasons. First, inconsistencies have
a very distinctive property within many logics, including classical logic: they entail every
other sentence, and thereby induce triviality (they ‘explode’). This means that defending
dialetheism involves adopting a non-classical logic in which inconsistencies do not have
this property – a ‘paraconsistent’ logic. A distaste for such logical complications might
incline  one  against  dialetheism.  Second,  there  is  a  long  tradition  in  philosophy,  from
Aristotle  onward,  of  arguing  that  ruling  out  inconsistency  is  in  some way or  other  a
cornerstone of rationality: to admit its possibility would e.g. undermine rational thought,
linguistic  meaning,  or  meaningful  disagreement.  Some  of  these  misgivings  about
dialetheism can be fairly easily addressed, whereas others lead to thorny dialectics. It’s not
going to be fruitful to involve ourselves in these general debates here, so I just point the
interested reader to Priest (1998) for an overview.
A terminological note before we move on. The approach to social ontology that I build on
here – Epstein’s – proceeds in terms of facts.  The notion of a fact that’s at work here is a
metaphysically  bland  one:  just  the  everyday  notion  of  something  being  the  case.  But
because  the  approach  proceeds  in  these  terms,  in  what  follows  I  will  frequently  be
speaking of contradictory or inconsistent facts, or inconsistencies in the facts. In doing so, I
13 A qualification is in order. Some logics, notably subvaluational ones (Jaśkowski 1969; Hyde 1997) are set
up precisely to block the derivation of an outright contradiction from an inconsistent set of sentences (by e.g.
rejecting  adjunction)  and  secure  paraconsistency  by  this  route.  So  in  these  logics,  one  cannot  strictly
characterize an inconsistency as a set of sentences that entails a contradiction; rather, one would have to
characterize them as sets of sentences that would entail contradictions in the presence of e.g. adjunction.
14 Prominent dialetheic treatments of the semantic paradoxes are Priest (1987/2006) and Beall (2009). Whereas
Priest considers the semantic paradoxes to be one among a number of dialetheic phenomena, Beall argues
that the possibility of real inconsistency is specific to the semantic realm.
15 The case of legal contradictions is discussed in  Priest (1987/2006,  ch. 13), with some follow-up in  Beall
(2017) and  Priest  (2017).  Just  recently  Bolton  and  Cull  (2020) have  argued  for  the  possibility  of  social
dialetheias by constructing, refining and defending a thought experiment involving a club of dialetheists
adopting an inconsistent set of rules to govern their club. Cameron (in press) also sketches a metaphysics of
social reality which would allow for inconsistency.
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am not intending to carve out some new and exotic notion of inconsistency, one that is
metaphysical rather than logical. Rather, it’s just a different way of expressing the notion
of inconsistency characterized above. I will ask the reader to imagine, when I speak of
inconsistencies in the social facts, that we have agreed upon some language in which to
characterize the social facts, and that I’m saying that the true description of the social facts,
in  that  language,  contains  sentences  which  entail  a  contradiction.  Similarly  I  will
sometimes speak of e.g. ‘the fact that ¬A’. Rather than invoking some metaphysical theory
of negative facts,  in those instances I am simply referring to a fact that,  in our chosen
language, would be expressed by the negation of a sentence that expresses the fact that A.
In  the  next  section,  I  will  state  the  prima  facie  case  for  the  possibility  of  social
inconsistency, a case which I will then subject to scrutiny.
3. Social Inconsistency
Using Epstein’s model, we can describe how a consistent set of physical facts can ground
an inconsistent set of social facts. All  that it takes is for us to anchor the wrong set of
grounding principles: one that is inconsistency-permitting.
We can think of Epstein’s frames as functions that take us from pre-social worlds – that is,
worlds that don’t yet have any social facts – to social worlds – worlds that do have social
facts. An inconsistency-permitting frame f  would then be one which, for some pre-social
world w1, yields a social world w1+ at which, for some social state of affairs A, both A and
¬A are the case. 
We can also think of frames (in a more fine-grained way) as sets of grounding principles
{G1, G2, G3, ..} that take us from a set of non-social facts (the grounds) to a set of social
facts  (the  grounded  facts).  Let  us  then  call  a  frame  f inconsistency-permitting  if  its
grounding principles are such that, for some set of grounding facts Γ and some social state
of affairs A, f makes Γ ground both the fact that A and the fact that ¬A. 
Such  an  inconsistency-permitting  frame  (whether  considered  as  a  set  of  grounding
conditionals or as a function from worlds to world) need not itself be inconsistent in any
sense.16 Nor does an inconsistency-permitting frame guarantee an inconsistent world. But
should the right grounding facts come about, such a frame gives us an inconsistent social
world, grounded in a consistent world. (In what follows, I will sometimes use ‘inconsistent
frame’ as shorthand for ‘inconsistency-permitting frame’.)
Those are just definitions, of course. The real question is: can we actually have a frame
that’s inconsistency-permitting? Well, for all that we have said so far, the answer seems to
be “yes”.
16 If a frame is taken to be a set of conditionals, it’s hard for it to be inconsistent in the absence of anything
that  renders  the  antecedents  of  these  conditionals  true  or  false.  It  could  happen  if  f includes  some
conditionals Γ  A, Γ   ¬A where Γ is equivalent to (a) some logical truth or (b) some other conditional
included in f.
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Anchoring,  as  described  above,  happens  in  a  piecemeal  way,  a  principle  here  and  a
principle there. The grounding principles are not put in place by some unified mechanism,
but  by  the  socially  and  temporally  distributed  operation  of  a  variety  of  anchoring
mechanisms.  This  means  that,  unless  there  is  some  kind  of  large-scale  and  effective
attempt at coordination going on within a population as things get anchored, there is no
guarantee that a frame would not end up with some dropped stitches. And one of the
things  that  might  go  wrong  is  that  at  some point,  by  some anchoring  mechanism,  a
grounding principle is anchored that entails that  Γ will  ground A, and at some other
point, another grounding principle is anchored that entails that  Γ will ground ¬A.17
Discussing some examples might help to make the possibility more concrete. (Note that I
am putting  these  forward as  illustrations,  not  as  evidence.)  Priest  (1987/2006) offers  a
simple example case. He imagines a polity which passes a law which says that those who
own a certain amount of property have the right to vote. It also passes a law which says
that being a woman bars you from voting. At the time these laws are passed, we are asked
to imagine, the possibility that a woman might own the requisite amount of property is so
distant that this scenario doesn’t even occur to the law-makers. But history ticks on and at
some point a woman does own that amount of property. She now, legally, has the right to
vote and does not have the right to vote.18 
Here, by passing the first law, the community has anchored a grounding principle which
lets the fact that someone can vote be grounded by the fact that they own a certain amount
of property. And by passing the second law, they have anchored a grounding principle
which lets  the fact  that  someone cannot vote be grounded by the fact  that  they are a
woman. Then all it takes is that someone satisfies both conditions for it to be a fact that
they can vote and a fact that they cannot vote.
Another example would be the venerable case of Euathlus and Protagoras: Protagoras has
trained Euathlus in rhetoric, and the two have signed a contract which entitles Protagoras
to a fee when Euathlus wins his first court case. But Euathlus tarries in getting his legal
career underway, so Protagoras sues him for the fee.19 We can take their contract, here, to
17 Along the same lines, one could also make a case for social indeterminacy: for some logically complete pre-
social world w1, a frame could be such that, for some Γ, it yields a social world w1+ such that, for some state of
affairs  A,  it  is  indeterminate whether the fact  that  A or  the fact  that  ¬A obtains.  I  do  not  explore  this
possibility here for reasons of space, but it is equally worthy of attention.
18 Of course various construals of this case are available. First,  Beall (2017), in response to this case, argues
that legal claims are implicitly always within the scope of an ‘according to legal system L, p’ operator. If so
the contradiction here would only be apparent, since ‘according to  L,  p,’ and ‘according to  L, ¬p’ are not
formal contradictories. Beall argues that there is no way, in these cases, to ‘detach’  p and ¬p from these
operators, so no contradiction can be derived. I do not think that Beall is right, but if he is, it would make the
law a bad source of examples (cf.  Bolton and Cull 2020). Second, most legal systems have meta-principles
that are designed to filter out conflicts between laws. The widely implemented  lex posterior principle says
that where laws conflict, the later law supersedes the earlier law, unless the earlier law has constitutional
status. To make the example work in spite of this, we can stipulate that there is no  lex posterior  or similar
principle in force in the situation imagined, or that the laws are promulgated simultaneously.
19 The story is related by Aulus Gellius (177/1927: bk. V, ch. 10)
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set  up  a  grounding  relation:  if  Euathlus  wins,  that  grounds  the  fact  that  he  owes
Protagoras the fee. But if Euathlus wins, that would also ground the fact that he does not
owe Protagoras the fee.20 
The Priest case is made up – though not particularly far-fetched – and the Protagoras-
Euathlus case is likely apocryphal, but purported actual examples have also been offered.
Ted Cohen (1992) argued that the then-official rules of baseball counted a runner as both
in and out (where being in entails not being out and being out entails not being in) if they
arrived at first base at the same time as they, or the base, were tagged. Cohen claimed to
have seen this very situation arise. Here, it’s the adoption of a set of rules for baseball that
sets up  grounding relations between on the one hand facts about the relative position of
people and balls, and on the other hand social facts about who is in or out. Since the rule-
makers failed to spot certain implications,  they created a situation in which consistent
physical facts could ground inconsistent social facts.21
Still, we might think: if social inconsistency is indeed possible, wouldn’t we expect to be
faced with it a bit more often? There are, however, reasons for thinking that such cases
might be rare and/or unobvious.
First,  social  inconsistencies  might  be  more  common  were  it  not for  the  fact  that  we
typically do not have a practical need to put in place grounding conditions for a social
state of affairs A and also, independently, for the state of affairs that ¬A. Rather, we would
specify grounds for A, and let ¬A be grounded by the absence of grounds for A. In such
cases,  no  opportunity  would  arise  for  rendering  the  frame  inconsistency-permitting.
Nevertheless,  in  sufficiently  complex  situations  it  could  easily  happen  that  grounding
conditions are specified for some state of affairs A and grounding conditions are specified
for some state of affairs B, where as it happens, A entails C and B entails ¬C for some state
of affairs C, and the grounding conditions for A and B are such that they could be jointly
satisfied. Imagine, for instance, that a tax code specifies grounds for being a small business
owner, a status which makes one liable for a certain kind of tax, and that it also specifies
grounds for working in a protected industry, a status which makes one exempt from that
same tax, and that they fail to rule out that someone might have both statuses.
Second, it is also plausible that the very cases where inconsistency-permitting principles
are more likely to have been anchored are also cases where the inconsistencies in question
are less likely to manifest. An inconsistency in a set of sentences can be ‘high-k’, where k is
the cardinality of the smallest inconsistent subset of the set; informally, this means that an
argument that derives the contradiction would have to have many (at least k) premises.22
20 By similar reasoning, Euathlus also does and does not owe the fee if he loses. But that is inessential: the
case is meant here to illustrate that a contradiction in the social facts (here, concerning what is legally owed)
is possible, not that it is inevitable. .
21 I’d like to thank Don Baxter for bringing this example to my attention. The 2010 edition of The Official Rules
of Major League Baseball fixed the rule (Christensen 2016).
22 See  List  (2006) for  details  on  this  k-measure,  which  he  there  uses  as  a  measure  of  the  ‘degree of
inconsistency’ of a body of information.
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We  are  presumably  better  at  avoiding  anchoring  inconsistency-permitting  sets  of
grounding principles the easier it is to spot how they would permit  contradictions. So
when a frame permits inconsistencies, they are likely to be towards the higher-k end of the
scale. Because more grounding conditions would have to be independently satisfied, the
actual  realisation of the inconsistencies in question would be less probable.  And when
they do occur,  they are also relatively more likely to lurk benignly in the background,
since it would take more work to derive an explicit contradiction from them.
Thus, if social inconsistencies are possible, they may in practice be rare, or hard to spot. 
In  this  section,  I’ve  given  an  argument  that  –  given  plausible  assumptions  about  the
metaphysics  of  social  facts  –  inconsistencies  in  the  social  facts  are  possible.  Though
‘argument’ is  a  bit  of  a  generous  term:  all  I’ve  really  done  is  point  out  that  a  two-
dimensional approach to social ontology does not rule out that a consistent physical reality
might ground an inconsistent social reality.  The real debate begins here,  for one might
well agree that a two-dimensional social ontology gives this result, but think that we have
philosophical reason to refine the theory so that it doesn’t give this result. The interesting
philosophical question is whether any refinements of this sort are (a) workable and (b)
well-motivated.
4. Cases against Inconsistency
Should  we  really  think  that  social  inconsistency  is  possible?  Unless  one  is  already
comfortable with dialetheism, one’s first reaction is probably to regard it as an unwelcome
theoretical result. It would be philosophically unsatisfying, however, to merely find some
theoretical tweak that makes the issue go away. We would like the changes we propose to
be motivated,  which is  to  say:  the theory should tell  us  why the prima facie case just
presented doesn’t survive scrutiny.
In this section I discuss lines of reasoning that one might appeal to in order to exclude the
possibility of social inconsistency. I treat some options briefly, because their limitations are
fairly clear. I dwell on one option more extensively, because I think it offers the defender
of consistency their best chance. But even that option, I argue, gives limited succour: it
allows  the  committed  consistentist  to  resist  social  inconsistency  in  a  way  that’s  well-
motivated  by their  own principles,  but  it  does not  have any suasive force  for  those not
antecedently opinionated about the possibility of inconsistency. So at the end of the day
the prima facie case stands, or so I’ll argue.
4.1. A Simple Argument
One quick way to argue against social dialetheias is  to argue against the possibility of
dialetheias generally, and then extend that to the social case. For instance, one could (a)
argue  that  one  ought  to  accept  classical  logic,  (b)  demonstrate  that  dialetheias  entail
everything on such a logic, (c) note that the social world is clearly not trivial, and then (d)
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modus tollens one’s way to rejecting social dialetheias. If one could conclusively argue
that classical logic (or some other explosive logic) is correct,  or that dialetheias are for
some other reason disastrous, rejecting social dialetheias on this basis would be fair play.
It would not be fruitful to enter that general debate here; I point the interested reader to
Priest et al. (2004). 
The main thing to note about this argument is that it doesn’t do anything to explain why
the social world doesn’t permit dialetheias, or give us any handle on how the mechanisms
that generate social facts prevent contradictions from arising. Insofar as the mechanism
I’ve  sketched  above  casts  some  measure  of  doubt on  the  impossibility  of  real
contradictions, invoking the impossibility of real contradictions against it only begs the
question. For that reason I’ll move on to lines of argument that engage more specifically
with the metaphysics of the case.
4.2. Social Anti-Realism
One response to the prima facie case is to take it at face value, but conclude from it that we
ought not accord social facts the same kind of serious ontological status as, say, chemical
or  astronomical  facts.  From dialetheism about  social  facts,  we infer  anti-realism about
social facts, the thought being that contradictions are tolerable only if they aren’t real. In
this section, I explore this idea. What I will argue is that while some form of anti-realism
about the social may be viable, it is not ultimately an effective way to deal with social
inconsistency.
Anti-realism comes in varieties, and I will first note one type of social anti-realism so that I
can set it aside for present purposes. A line of thought one sometimes encounters is that
social facts are mind-dependent, and therefore not real.23 As we’ve seen in §1.1 above, it is
debatable whether we should regard social facts in general as mind-dependent,  and as
various authors have pointed out in recent years (Khalidi 2016; Mason 2020), the inference
from mind-dependence to anti-realism is a questionable one. I will say this: if there is a
sense of the term ‘real’ in which one can reasonably conclude that something is not real
from the fact that it is mind-dependent, it will be a rather attenuated sense which will not
placate those worrying about social inconsistency. Some (e.g.  Fine 2001) have proposed
reserving the status of reality for the metaphysically fundamental facts, and since what is
mind-dependent is thereby not fundamental, this would indeed let us validly infer that
mind-dependent social facts are not real. However, this would do no more than put social
facts on the same plane of reality as e.g. chemical, biological and astronomical facts – all
standardly regarded as not metaphysically fundamental – and to find an inconsistency in
23 Although  this  line  of  reasoning  is  a  familiar  bit  of  philosophical  folklore  in  social  ontology,  it  is
nevertheless not easy to find authors onto whom this inference can be firmly pinned.  Mason (2020) cites
Hayek  (1943),  Searle  (2007) and  Thomasson  (2003b),  but  of  those  only  Thomasson  is  an  unambiguous
example (and her anti-realist conclusions do not extend to the whole of social reality). But see also Khalidi
(2016) for some examples of the inference from mind-dependence to anti-realism in general metaphysics.
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the social facts would then be the same, as far as badness goes, as finding one among any
of those facts. So I set the kind of anti-realism that is motivated by the (supposed) mind-
dependence of social facts aside, and focus on more full-blooded anti-realisms.24
This still  leaves  us with options;  it  will  help to have a somewhat  specific proposal  to
grapple with, so for concreteness’ sake let us explore a  fictionalist proposal. We construe
Epstein-style frames as capturing the rules of an elaborate and useful pretence, one that
we all participate in every time we engage in social interactions. Organisations, artefacts,
laws and the like do not really exist, but it serves our practical purposes to act as if they
do, and this pretence is pervasive, in that there aren’t any occasions where we have cause
to drop it. 
Instead of grounding principles of the form ‘if A, then A grounds B’, we would take the
frame to consist in principles of the form ‘if A, then in the fiction, B’.25 If  the frame is
inconsistency-permitting, then depending on what the non-social world that we take our
cues from is like, we may end up with a fiction that is inconsistent.26 But – the thought
would go – this is not metaphysically problematic. Fictions, like beliefs, utterances, and
theories, can be inconsistent.
Fictionalism in general is a well-explored approach, and the social fictionalist would have
resources  to  draw on  in  articulating  the  details  of  their  view.27 There  are  challenges,
though. Thomasson (2003a) mounts an argument against treating social facts as fictional,
which turns on the idea that for us to be able to pretend that a thing has some property,
the property in question must already be associated with instantiation conditions that we
take the thing to not really satisfy. To pretend, for instance, that a tree-stump is a bear is to
have in mind what it really takes to be a bear, and pretend that the tree-stump satisfies
those conditions.28 Our  social  practices  couldn’t  be  a  pretence  of  this  sort,  Thomasson
argues. When we treat an object as having some social property, we do not act as if some
object satisfies that property’s instantiation conditions when really it doesn’t; though we
might have stipulated the relevant instantiation conditions out of thin air, in typical cases
the object really does satisfy them, and as a result, really does have the property.
I suspect the social fictionalist could thread the needle here, and perhaps  insist that the
conditions we get to put in place for social facts aren’t really instantiation conditions for
properties at all, but really just conditions for certain pretence-behaviour involving that
object to be apt, whatever that might precisely entail psychologically and behaviourally.
More generally,  they could draw upon the example of other fictionalisms,  for instance
24 Mason (2016) discusses a number of different ways of qualifying social facts as not real.
25 Or ‘if A, then in the fiction A grounds B’, if one wanted to build in fictional grounding structure. 
26 For this to work, the rules of the ‘in the fiction ...’ operator should permit us to derive ‘in the fiction, A and
¬A’ from ‘in the fiction, A’ and ‘in the fiction, ¬A’. But this seems like a plausible way for such an operator to
behave, assuming it’s the same fiction in both cases.
27 See Eklund (2007/2019) for an overview of fictionalist proposals. I have not been able to turn up examples
of fictionalist approaches to social facts generally, but Logue (in press) argues for fictionalism about gender.
28 The example is from Walton (1990: 37).
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mathematical fictionalism (Field 1980) in which there is likewise no contrast to be drawn
between what fictionally satisfies the instantiation conditions of a mathematical property
and what really does. 
There are other more general challenges for the fictionalist (see Eklund (2007/2019) for an
overview)  but  I  think  that  at  the  end of  the  day,  a  coherent  social  fictionalism could
probably be articulated. And if one is specifically concerned not to countenance anything
inconsistent in reality, it will do that trick. Let us suppose for the sake of argument that
this is done; I suspect that the fictionalist would not thereby have achieved quite what
they hoped.
Here is the real trouble, as I see it. Let’s say that one’s misgivings about contradictions
relate to explosion and triviality. Note, now, that a social fiction in which everything is
true is not really any better than a social reality in which everything is true. For even if the
social world is a fiction, it is a fiction we continually participate in and which we cannot
practically opt out of – the social world, fictional or otherwise, is the means by which we
collectively get along together and get things done. If, in the presence of a contradiction,
we are committed to a social fiction which is entirely trivial, that fiction would not serve its
purpose. 
One could deal with this problem by adopting a non-explosive logic, but that option was
already available without going fictionalist. And although I won’t argue the details here, I
think that other types of general misgivings about contradictions, whatever their merits29,
are also unlikely to be assuaged simply by going fictionalist about social dialetheias, for
the same reason: the social world is such that, even it isn’t real, we are condemned to treat
it for virtually all intents and purposes as if it is, warts and all. This type of trouble would
thus generalize to  any form of  social  anti-realism which,  like fictionalism,  manages to
classify the social as unreal but leaves us to deal with it for practical purposes as if it is
real.  The motivation for anti-realism falls away: an anti-realist would still  have to take
some additional, different measures to assuage their worries about social inconsistency,
and there  is  no  reason to  think  that  they  are  in  any  better  place  to  implement  those
measures in virtue of having gone anti-realist.30
29 Priest (1998) gives an overview of such general misgivings.
30 Might there be something special about fictions, such that moving to fictionalism makes available ways of
dealing with inconsistency that we wouldn’t otherwise have? There is a significant literature on inconsistent
fictions which we might consult for inspiration, in which some argue for the possibility of inconsistency in
fiction  (e.g.  Currie 1990; Priest  1997; Wildman  and Folde  2017)  and  some  against  (e.g.  Hanley  2004;
Xhignesse 2016; 2020). Since this literature is mainly concerned with literary fictions, the upshot of these
debates for fictionalism is not necessarily obvious, but the fictionalist could nevertheless find resources there.
Besides the already-mentioned approach of moving to a non-explosive logic, another interesting approach to
dealing with fictional inconsistency is to move to a subtler account of truth-in-fiction: following Xhignesse
(2016; 2020), for instance, a social fictionalist might propose that, when inconsistencies appear to arise, they
count as (in some sense)  claimed in the social  fiction but  nevertheless not  true according to it.  On such a
strategy, the essential move is to not straightforwardly identify what’s true in a fiction with all the things
prima facie laid down for it, but instead identify it with some more well-behaved function of the latter. I
think there is  some mileage in such an approach.  But  here too,  I  do not  think fictionalism is  really an
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The alternative that this makes salient is  a ‘revolutionary’ anti-realism about the social
which tells us not only that the social is unreal but also that we ought to stop treating it as
real. This would be a error theory about social reality: there are no social facts, and thus no
inconsistent ones. Error theories have been defended about specific social discourses; for
instance,  eliminativists  about  race  (e.g.  Appiah  1995)  argue that,  as  there  are  no such
things as human races, claims about race are erroneous across the board. But as a general
approach to social facts, there seems to be very limited mileage in a revolutionary error
theory; assuming it could be implemented at all, it would thereby effectively deprive us of
the social world altogether, and of all that it does for us. We would cut off our noses to
spite our faces.31 
Thus social anti-realism seems, if not necessarily unviable as a general approach in social
ontology, not to be an effective response to the prima facie case for social inconsistency set
out above. 
4.3. Appeals to Institutional Functions
Theories in social ontology sometimes accord an important role to institutions, as a central
type of social entity used to explain various other kinds of social entities and social facts.
Let’s  take  this  idea  on  board  for  the  sake  of  argument.  Institutions  typically  serve  a
purpose, and for a given institution to serve its purpose it has to be put together a certain
way.  Take the  aforementioned  institution of  greeting people.  There  are many possible
conventions for greeting people, but the possibilities are constrained by the function of
greeting. Waving your hand or clicking your heels could be a way of greeting. Mentally
adding 5 and 7 together is not a possible way of greeting, because it isn’t a public event
and therefore  simply won’t  do the  job.  Thus there  are  functional  constraints  on what
principles we can anchor to govern institutions.
Perhaps,  then,  functional  constraints  are  what  stop  us  from  having  an  inconsistency-
permitting frame. We just cannot anchor the grounding principles that determine the facts
about some social institution in such a way that the facts about it could end up being
essential step in implementing it: this is the structure of the ‘holist’ strategy that I will explore in section 4.4,
which I will ultimately recommend to the consistentist as their best option.
31 Error theory is little explored in social ontology. One approach which might be classed as error-theoretic is
the ethnomethodological approach in anthropology/sociology (Garfinkel 1967). It holds that ethnographers
are  not  warranted  in  treating  their  subjects’  utterances  about  social  matters  as  evidence  about  social
structures that the people in the community under investigation inhabit. Instead, they should merely take
these utterances as evidence about how those people try to make some sense (successfully or unsuccessfully)
of the social interactions that they engage in.  The subjects may be optimistically assuming the existence of
some meaning-giving social order in order to make it through the day, but whether anything coherent or
interpersonally stable could be reconstructed out of their ideas of it is doubtful,  and moot. Whether this
approach is best interpreted as an error theory is, of course, debatable – one might also frame it as a kind of
methodological scepticism or quietism about social structures. See  Collin (1997:  ch. 1) for a philosophical
assessment of ethnomethodology.
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inconsistent, for then the social institution wouldn’t be able to fulfil its purpose. So if the
institution does exist and does serve its function, then it cannot have been so anchored. 
This initial thought, however intuitive, faces challenges:
1. There would have to be a suitably close connection between (a) the facts about some
social institution being inconsistent and (b) the institution not fulfilling its function.
Setting aside  the  idea  that  dialetheias  as  such are  world-ending disasters,  it  is  not
obvious that they always entail bad consequences for institutional functioning. Some
might  have  no  consequences  for  institutional  functioning;  some  might  even  be
beneficial.  When they  do give rise to problems in the functioning of an institution,
these might be malfunctions rather than a general failure to function.
2. Because this strategy invokes the idea of an institution’s purpose, it only applies when
institutions have purposes.  But some (e.g. the hereditary nobility) might not, and it
would be odd to hold that institutions can be inconsistent, but only when they serve no
purpose.
3. Suppose that, in some case, inconsistency would stop some actually existing institution
i  from fulfilling its function. Suppose that some anchoring facts (A1, A2, A3, …) are in
place  that  would,  on  the  face  of  it,  anchor  some inconsistency-permitting  frame  fi
governing i. On the present proposal, the operative frame for i  cannot be fi  – so some
different frame fi* must instead be in place. But given that there typically would not be
a unique way to make fi consistent, what is the frame fi*, and what facts determine that
it is the operative frame?
Thus, while it is plausible that there are ways our institutions couldn’t have been, this idea
is hard to shape into an explanation of the consistency of social facts.
4.4. Anchor Holism
We  have  assumed  above  that  anchoring  happens  in  a  piecemeal  way:  we  anchor  a
principle here, a principle there, and the frame is what we get by adding up everything
that’s  been  anchored.  This  is  why  inconsistency  seems  easy:  if  we  anchor  principles
without coordination, why expect the result to always make sense? But perhaps this is not
how anchoring should be understood. Perhaps anchoring is not piecemeal; perhaps entire
frames are put in place at once. Call this the holistic option. 
We can articulate this further. Let’s say that there is a space of candidate frames f1, f2, f3, …,
best viewed in this case as the space of functions from pre-social worlds to social worlds.
What determines which of these is our frame is which one of these frames fits best with our
overall anchoring-related behaviours. These candidate frames are not just any old list of
principles, in the same way that a possible world isn’t just any old set of propositions. A
candidate frame has to fit  a certain formal profile,  and that includes (we propose) not
being inconsistency-permitting. As a result, whatever is anchored is guaranteed to force
consistency upon the social world. 
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This is just a technical proposal for how to build consistency into the Epstein model; it
needs  motivating.  But  a  reasonable  motivation  can  be  given.  Picture  a  frame  as  a
theoretical posit: something that an anthropologist studying the social interactions within
some population  (say) would hypothesize to explain the behaviour they observe.  They
observe what people say and do, and they propose a way of making all that add up to a
social reality, one in which people are responding in reasonable ways to each other and to
the situations they’re in. A frame, viewed in this way, has a particular kind of explanatory
function: it is meant to rationalize people’s social behaviour.32 If this is the point of positing
a frame, then it makes sense that frames might have to obey certain general conditions of
coherence, for that could be part and parcel of their rationalizing explanatory role.33
We’re  not  quite  there  yet.  If  this  is  to  constitute  a  response  to  the  issue  of  social
inconsistency,  we need  to  argue  specifically  that  one  of  the  conditions  that  candidate
frames must obey is consistency. To do that we must show that consistency contributes to
making  the  explanation  yielded  by  the  frame  an  appropriately  rationalizing  one.
Furthermore,  we  cannot  merely  argue  that  by  inducing  consistency,  a  frame is  ceteris
paribus a better explanation. That would only motivate attributing a consistency-inducing
frame on the specific occasions where it would yield a better explanation. If consistency is
a general requirement on candidate frames, it must be the case that, in each case where we
might explain a population’s behaviour with an inconsistency-permitting frame, there is a
consistency-inducing candidate frame that does a better job of explaining that behaviour.  
In effect we need something like a dominance argument for consistency as a condition on
frames,  somewhat  like  the  dominance arguments  that  formal  epistemologists  offer  for
probabilism as a condition on rational credences (e.g.  Joyce 1998). But it is not clear that
such an argument is available.
Imagine  what  a  case  might  look  like  in  which  we  would  consider  attributing  an
inconsistency-permitting frame to a population. Imagine we are documenting the social
structures  of   population  P,  the  inhabitants  of  an  isolated  village.  For  population  P,
imagine  that  grounding  principles  for  social  facts  are  typically  put  in  place  via  the
pronouncements of a local authority figure – call them the Reeve. The Reeve comes up
with  principles  and  declares  them  to  the  group,  and  the  villagers  treat  these
pronouncements as authoritative. Now distinguish two cases. 
1. The Reeve has put in place a principle to the effect that sheep are not for eating, and
later, perhaps in a lapse of judgement, puts in place a principle to the effect that mutton
is to be served on Fridays. This presents the villagers with a conundrum, and they end
up quietly ignoring the second pronouncement, treating it as some kind of anomaly. If
32 A  good  explanation  of  this  sort  needn’t  make  the  behaviour  perfectly rational,  just  as  a  charitable
interpretation of a person’s utterances needn’t make them perfectly correct – it just needs to make them
reasonable to the degree that we expect human beings to be.
33 This way of motivating anchor holism is inspired by metasemantic ‘interpretationism’ in the style of Lewis
(1974). Like Lewis, I do not take interpretationism to entail any form of anti-realism about the category of
facts in question.
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we as theorists now have to choose between attributing an inconsistent frame to P on
which  sheep  are  both  for  eating  and not  for  eating  and a  consistent  frame which
excludes  the mutton-on-Fridays principle,  the choice is  easy;  the latter explains  the
villagers’ behaviour much better than the former.
2. The Reeve makes many pronouncements, and often doesn’t remember what principles
they  have  put  in  place.  Fortunately,  their  principles  often  concern  matters  of  little
practical import. They put in place a principle to the effect that lambs born on a Sunday
are noble creatures, and a principle to the effect that lambs born on a weekend are not
noble creatures. Nothing practical follows from this either way, so villagers are happy
to affirm the truth of both of these principles if prompted. In this case, it seems there is
no explanatory advantage to be gained by attributing to P a consistent frame which
edits  out  the  inconsistency,  as  opposed  to  an  inconsistent  one  that  leaves  it  in.  A
consistent frame, in this case, would have both a lesser degree of fit with the apparent
anchoring  facts  and  less  explanatory  value  with  regard  to  villagers’  behaviour
(specifically, their utterances).
It does not seem, then, that consistent frames dominate inconsistent ones when it comes to
rationalizing behaviour; it is not such a universal panacea that we need to build it into the
very idea of a frame.
The  defender  of  consistency  has  a  reply  to  offer  here,  though.  For  if  our  imaginary
anthropologist is a classical logician, it may not seem to them that interpreting case (2)
through the lens of an inconsistent frame is a good idea at all. If it is true in (2) that sheep
are and are not noble creatures, then by explosion everything is true in the social world of
(2), including many things that do not chime at all with the behaviour in the group. The
same applies to any situation in which an inconsistent frame is applied. So by the lights of
such an anthropologist, consistent frames do dominate inconsistent ones.
This leaves the defender of consistency in a somewhat ambiguous position. On the one
hand, they now have a reasonable way to maintain their position against the prima facie
case for social dialetheias given in  §4. Rather than just denying the possibility of such
things flat out, they can tell a story about anchoring which explains, on their principles,
how it is that dialetheias fail to arise. On the other hand, this story only works given a
background  commitment  to  consistency,  for  only  on  those  principles  does  it  make
dialectical sense to appeal to the principle of explosion in the dominance argument. Thus
if  we  were  trying  to  sway  an  audience  that’s  unopinionated  about  the  possibility  of
inconsistency, and which perhaps has been given some reason to doubt consistency in the
form of the argument of §3, this story would do no good.
Independently  of how  it  bears  on  the  issue  of  inconsistency,  anchor  holism  is  an
interesting refinement of the Epstein model, and may be worth exploring further  for its
own sake. It is also possible that anchor holism can be paired with motivations other than
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the ‘interpretationist’ one I’ve sketched here, and that might provide other ways for the
dialetheist and consistentist to skirmish. But I will leave the matter here.
5. Ramifications of Social Inconsistency
I  have  explored  a  number  of  avenues  of  arguing  against  the  possibility  of  social
dialetheias. Of these, anchor holism has the most mileage in it, and I recommend it to the
consistentist.  But ultimately, even anchor holism does not serve to undercut the prima
facie argument for the possibility of social inconsistency given in §3.
And arguably, we should not find social inconsistency all that weird. We do not find it
metaphysically puzzling when people’s  thoughts,  utterances or theories turn out to be
inconsistent. It is unfortunate, perhaps, but it is simply what we should expect, given basic
human fallibility. If I am right, social inconsistency is just the same kind of basic human
fallibility, but writ large upon on the canvas of social reality, in a way made possible by
the way that social reality depends on us and our behaviour. 
If  the  social  world  does  permit  inconsistency,  then  there  will  be  a  certain  amount  of
constructive theorizing to do, in order to deal with the ramifications of this possibility. I
will not undertake that constructive work here; I’ll limit myself to noting some of the tasks
that I leave for another occasion.
1. As noted, any form of non-trivial dialetheism requires a paraconsistent logic. There
are, of course, well-developed logics of this sort that one can more or less take off
the shelf. But there would nevertheless be work to do in figuring out how adopting
certain sorts of paraconsistent logic would interact  with other formal machinery
that a two-dimensional social ontology requires, such as a multi-modal or multi-
frame logic for regimenting modal and counterfactual reasoning about worlds and
frames. Perhaps certain paraconsistent logics would fit more neatly than others in
the overall toolkit of social ontology – this is something to be explored.
2. Social  inconsistencies would  arguably  have  some  metanormative  ramifications.
Social facts often matter to us because they have a normative upshot; they give rise
to reasons, obligations, permissions, excuses, and so on. Imagine a state of affairs A
such that A entails, for some individual x, that x ought to φ, and ¬A entails that x
ought not to φ. In such a case, one might think, an inconsistency to the effect that A
and ¬A would give rise to a normative dilemma; x both ought and ought not to φ.
Some work would need to be done to explore these issues: would social dialetheism
commit one, for instance, to rejecting the principle of ought-implies-can?34 
34 Priest (1987/2006: ch. 13) discusses what becomes of deontic notions in a dialetheic setting. One option is to
deny  ought-implies-can;  this  is  an  option  that  some  metaethicists  have independently  argued  for  (e.g.
Sinnott-Armstrong 1984). A dialetheist would also have the option of maintaining ought-implies-can and
counting violations of it as just more dialetheias. 
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3. Inconsistencies in the social facts might also have ramifications for the metaphysics
of social facts itself. In Epstein’s anchoring-grounding model, it is common for the
facts that serve to anchor grounding principles to themselves be social facts. Thus, it
seems  in  principle  possible  that,  when  such  anchoring  facts  end  up  being
inconsistent, we end up with inconsistencies regarding what grounding principles
are in force, and inconsistencies in what facts are and are not grounded. Some work
is needed to explore how this sort of possibility would complicate the view.
6. A Methodological Moral
I take myself, at this point, to have given a basic case for social inconsistency, and to have
shown that it survives a certain amount of scrutiny. Let us then assume, for the sake of
argument,  that  the social  world might  be  inconsistent.  What consequences  would this
have for how we should approach social philosophy more widely?
Many  phenomena  studied  by  philosophers  are  suspected  of  having  some  aspect  of
conventionality or social construction about them. Paradigm cases include human kinds
like  races  and  genders;  social  roles;  artefacts,  artworks  and  institutions.  The  more
controversial  cases  include  moral  and  epistemic  norms;  various  kinds  of  scientific
classifications;  logical  and  mathematical  facts.  Depending  on  how debate  about  these
phenomena turns out, the category of social facts may end up embracing quite a bit of the
reality around us. Thus, the nature of social facts has a bearing on areas of philosophy well
beyond social ontology proper.
In philosophy, we tend to apply certain constraints to our theorizing independently of
whether the phenomena we deal with are socially constructed or not. Consistency is one of
these. If our attempt to give a theory of some phenomenon ends in contradiction, we take
this to be a strike against the theory. But where have no general metaphysical grounds for
thinking that the phenomenon we are studying will be consistent, inconsistency should
not be an immediate disqualifying feature in our theories. In such cases, an inconsistent
theory  might be a bad theory, but it also might be a good theory about an inconsistent
phenomenon. If I am right, and social inconsistency is a possibility, then this is something
that has methodological import for all those areas of philosophy that deal with facts that
are  or  may be  social  ones,  like  the  ones  listed  above.  Consistency,  as  a  constraint  on
theorizing, ought to be in abeyance.
7. Conclusion
The social world is a peculiar bit of reality. It is real and objective, but it is shaped by our
thought,  talk  and  action.  Because  of  this,  the  incoherence  that  we  expect  to  occur  in
thought and language can be expected to percolate through into social reality, in a way
that  it  doesn’t  into  other  parts  of  reality.  I  have  argued  for  the  possibility  of  social
inconsistency, and I’ve teased out some of the significance that this possibility would have.
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All this is somewhat preliminary. I expect there to be further lines of argument against
social inconsistency that I haven’t considered here, and perhaps further lines of argument
in  favour  of  it.  And  as  noted,  much  remains  to  be  done  in  the  way  of  constructive
theorizing, if we are to take this possibility seriously. 
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